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Abstract
Over the past decade or so, the electricity industry of the Republic of Turkey
(and indeed the world) has undergone profound reform in its structure, 
ownership and mindset. Increasing public concern about efficiency in the 
sector has led Turkey to discard the traditional model of a vertically 
integrated industry subject to cost-based regulation in favor of the unbundling 
of activities and the introduction of competition where it is possible. The 
industry has been structurally separated into generation, transmission, 
distribution and retail segments. The competitive segments of the industry 
(generation and retail) are planed to progressively expose to competition; the 
monopoly segments (especially, distribution) are to be reoriented to foster 
competition. Further, the ownership of the industry is under increasing 
pressure to move away from the public domain into the private one. The 
present article not only presents an analysis of the Turkish distribution sector 
and proposed privatization process but also provides some guidelines for 
policy makers.
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21. Introduction
Turkey’s electricity distribution utility, TEDAS, and its distribution companies 
are Turkish state-owned joint-stock companies engaged in the distribution 
and retail sale of electricity and provision of retail services to final customers. 
With approximately 28 million customers, 93 billion kWh of electricity sales 
and 98% market share in electricity distribution across Turkey in 2005, 
TEDAS and its distribution companies together form one of the largest 
organizations in the country (Lazard, 2007). 
In the article, the evolution of Turkish electricity distribution industry is 
analyzed and then the decision about the privatization of Turkish electricity 
distribution regions is considered. The article is divided into four main 
sections. In Section 2 the reader is briefly familiarized with the Turkish 
economy and energy situation. Section 3 provides an impression of the 
Turkish electricity distribution business; including its evolution, recent market 
reforms, legal environment and ongoing privatization process. Section 4
elaborates on the question of “why should the distribution be privatized?”. In 
Section 5, current policies are evaluated and some guidelines are introduced 
for policy makers to prevent some irreversible mistakes in market structure 
policy. Finally, a summary and some concluding remarks are provided in 
Section 6.
32. A summary of Turkish economy and energy situation
The Republic of Turkey, located in Southeastern Europe and Southwestern 
Asia (that portion of Turkey west of the Bosporus is geographically part of 
Europe), has an area of about 780,580 sq km and a population of over 70 
million (CIA, 2007). With its young population, growing energy demand per 
person, fast growing urbanization and economic development, Turkey has 
been one of the fast growing power markets of the world for the last two 
decades. Turkey is an energy importing country; more than half of the energy 
requirement has been supplied by imports.
Turkey's dynamic economy is a complex mix of modern industry and 
commerce along with a traditional agriculture sector that still accounts for 
more than 35% of employment. It has a strong and rapidly growing private 
sector, yet the state still plays a major role in basic industry, banking, 
transport, and communication. Real GNP growth has exceeded 6% in many 
years, but this strong expansion has been interrupted by sharp declines in 
output in 1994, 1999 and 2001 due to economic crisis. The economy is 
turning around with the implementation of economic reforms and 2004 GDP 
growth reached 9%, followed by roughly 5% annual growth from 2005-06. 
Inflation fell to 7.7% in 2005, a 30-year low, but climbed back to 9.8% in 
2006. Despite the strong economic gains from 2002-06, which were largely 
due to renewed investor interest in emerging markets, IMF backing, and 
tighter fiscal policy, the economy is still burdened by a high current account 
deficit and high debt. Prior to 2005, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey 
averaged less than $1 billion annually, but further economic and judicial 
4reforms and prospective EU membership1 are expected to boost FDI. 
Privatization sales are currently approaching $21 billion (CIA, 2007).
Turkey's population of more than 70 million is growing at an annual rate of 
1.04% and expected to grow to 83.4 million in 2022. In response to the 
growth rates of population and consumption, Turkey's total final energy 
consumption (TFC) grew at an average annual rate of 9.6% over the last 
three decades. This average annual growth rate of TFC is projected to 
decrease to 5.4% between 2005 and 2010 and 7% between 2010 and 2020 
(Evrendilek et al., 2003). Table 1 presents some important selected 
Indicators for Turkey as of 2004 (CIA, 2007).
[ Table 1 goes here ]
Turkey's primary energy sources include hydropower, geothermal, lignite, 
hard coal, oil, natural gas, wood, animal and plant wastes, solar and wind 
energy. In 2004, primary energy production and consumption has reached 
24.1 million tonnes (Mt) of oil equivalent (Mtoe) and 81.9 Mtoe, respectively. 
Table 2 shows the Turkey's energy balance table in 2004. Fossil fuels 
provided about 86.9% of the total energy consumption of the year 2004, with 
oil (31.5%) in first place, followed by coal (27.3%) and natural gas (22.8%). 
Turkey has not utilized nuclear energy yet2. The Turkish coal sector, which 
includes hard coal as well as lignite, accounts for nearly one half of the 
country's total primary energy production (%43.7). The renewables 
collectively provided 13.2% of the primary energy, mostly in the form of 
5combustible renewables and wastes (6.8%), hydropower (about 4.8%) and 
other renewable energy resources (approximately 1.6%) (IEA, 2007)
[ Table 2 goes here ]
As can be seen in Table 2, the general equilibrium of energy use and supply 
indicators show that Turkey is dependent on import resources very heavily. In 
2004, 77.6% of the total energy supply was met by imports, and the rest was 
domestically produced.
Turkey’s total electricity production and installed capacity were 162.5 GWh3
and 38.8 MW, respectively, in 2005 (Erdogdu, 2007a). The distribution of the 
produced electricity energy according to primary energy sources was as 
follows: natural gas 44.74%, hydropower 25.11%, coal 25.05%, oil 4.92%, 
biomass 0.09%, geothermal 0.06% and wind 0.04% (Kone et al., 2007). 
Table 3 reflects the increasing reliance on natural gas4 in the power sector. 
The share of natural gas power plants in installed capacity was about 37% in 
2005. Likewise, natural gas had the largest share in gross electricity output in 
2005.
[ Table 3 goes here ]
Recently, Turkey has initiated a major reform program of the regulatory 
framework surrounding the most important segments of her energy market; 
namely, electricity, natural gas, petroleum and liquefied petroleum gas 
industries. The reform program entails privatization, liberalization as well as a 
6radical restructuring of the whole energy industry. Also, an autonomous 
regulatory body, Energy Market Regulatory Authority5 (EMRA), was created 
to set up and maintain a financially strong, stable, transparent and 
competitive energy market.
The Turkish electricity industry is a large, high-growth sector in the Turkish 
economy. The industry contributes significantly to the country’s GDP and is a 
USD 12 billion industry at current end-user prices. The sector’s share in the 
Turkish economy has been growing rapidly, given the 8% per annum growth 
in electricity demand over the past two decades. This rate of demand growth 
has been higher than the growth rates seen in other major Turkish industries
and outstrips growth in the Turkish economy overall.
Distribution losses of the system, which amounted to 19.8 billion kWh in 
2004, are high compared to international benchmarks. Accordingly, one of 
the primary objectives of the electricity sector reform has been defined as 
reducing the loss/theft ratio to OECD levels.
Despite increasing demand, Turkey’s per capita gross consumption is still 
very low at 2,090 kWh compared to the EU average of 6,460 kWh. According 
to the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) 2004-2020 
projections that assume a continued cumulative annual growth rate of 7.7% 
in gross demand, per capita consumption is forecasted to reach 5,700 kWh 
by 2020.
7The forces that fuel growth in the sector are continued economic and 
industrial development, population growth and improving income levels. 
According to projections prepared by the national transmission company 
TEIAS on the growth of supply, there is sufficient generation capacity at least 
until year 2009. Required investments for more capacity are expected to be 
covered primarily by private sector investments (Lazard, 2007).
3. An Outline of Turkish Electricity Distribution Industry
3.1. Evolution of the Turkish electricity industry6
This section of the paper provides a brief overview of the evolution of 
electricity industry in Turkey with a view to reveal the dynamics that have 
shaped current reform process in electricity distribution sector.
The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, and until the 1930s the 
electricity industry was heavily dependent on foreign investment as the 
country was trying a liberal economy. In the 1930s, there was a widespread 
belief all over the world in the benefits of public ownership of the electricity 
industry. Following this trend, nationalization of Turkish electricity industry 
started in 1938 and, by 1944, almost all electricity industry had been placed 
within the public domain.
In the 1960s, the government started the “development plans era”. The 
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) was established in 1963, 
and was responsible for Turkey’s energy policy. This was followed in 1970 by 
8the creation of Turkish Electricity Administration (TEK), which would have a 
monopoly in the Turkish electricity sector at almost all stages apart from 
distribution, which were left to the local administrations7.
In the early 1980s, as was the case in many European countries, the Turkish 
electricity industry was dominated by a state-owned vertically integrated 
company, TEK. Starting from the 1980s, the government sought to attract 
private participation into the industry in order to ease the investment burden 
on the general budget. In 1982, the monopoly of public sector on generation 
was abolished and the private sector was allowed to build power plants and 
sell their electricity to TEK. In 1984, TEK was restructured and gained the 
status of state-owned enterprise. 
Various private sector participation models short of privatization were put into 
practice. The first law setting up a framework for private participation in 
electricity industry was enacted in 1984 (Law No. 3096). This Law forms the 
legal basis for private participation through Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) 
contracts for new generation facilities, Transfer of Operating Rights (TOOR) 
contracts for existing generation and distribution assets, and the 
autoproducer system for companies to produce their own electricity. Under a 
BOT concession, a private company would build and operate a plant for up to 
99 years (subsequently reduced to 49 years) and then transfer it to the state 
at no cost. Under a TOOR, the private enterprise would operate (and 
rehabilitate where necessary) an existing government-owned facility through 
a lease-type arrangement (Atiyas and Dutz, 2003).
9In 1993, TEK was incorporated into privatization plan and split into two 
separate state-owned enterprises, namely Turkish Electricity Generation 
Transmission Co. (TEAS) and Turkish Electricity Distribution Co. (TEDAS). 
However, the constitutional court of Turkey issued a series of rulings in 1994 
and 1995 making the privatization almost impossible to implement in 
electricity industry. Therefore, in August 1999, the parliament passed a 
constitutional amendment permitting the privatization of public utility services 
and allowing international arbitration for resolving disputes. However, during 
this interval, Turkey not only lost five invaluable years in terms of reform 
process that could never get back but also, and more importantly, tried to 
enhance the attractiveness of BOT projects by providing “take or pay” 
guarantees by the Undersecretariat of Treasury for adding new generation 
capacity to meet anticipated demand. An additional law, namely the Build 
Operate and Own8 (BOO) Law (No. 4283), for private sector participation in 
the construction and operation of new power plants was also enacted in 1997 
again with guarantees provided by the Treasury9.
3.2. Recent electricity market reforms
By the end of the 1990s, it became clear that quasi-privatization with 
Treasury guarantees was not going to be feasible given the rapidly 
deteriorating fiscal situation. Therefore, Turkey turned to a radically different 
framework for the design of her energy market.
On 3 March 2001, Electricity Market Law (EML, No. 4628) came into force 
and aimed at establishing a financially strong, stable, transparent and 
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competitive electricity market. In line with new law, TEAS was restructured to 
form three new state-owned public enterprises, namely Turkish Electricity 
Transmission Co. (TEIAS), Electricity Generation Co. (EUAS) and Turkish 
Electricity Trading and Contracting Co. (TETAS). The new law also created 
an autonomous regulatory body, namely Energy Market Regulatory Authority 
(EMRA). 
Electricity Market Law10 (EML) made former laws on private investment in the 
electricity sector obsolete. The main issues and building blocks of the new 
system are given below.
3.2.1. Market Opening and Market Design
As of January 2008, on the demand side, consumers that consume more 
than 1.2 GWh per annum are designated as “eligible consumers” that are 
free to choose their suppliers. The ultimate aim is stated as 100% market 
opening. On the supply side, the authorization-type licensing framework was 
established in the new regime, which provides entry opportunities into 
generation, wholesale supply, distribution, retail supply, import and export of 
electricity. Transmission remains as a state monopoly.
At the heart of the new regime is a bilateral contracts market where 
generation companies contract with wholesale trade companies (TETAS and 
any eventual new entrants), distribution companies, any new independent 
retail supply companies, and eligible consumers. As for end-users, eligible 
consumers may not only buy electricity from their regional distribution/retail 
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supply company, but also may buy directly from a wholesale company, a new 
independent retail supply company or an independent generator. Captive (or 
non-eligible) consumers, on the other hand, must buy their electricity from the 
distribution/retail supply company in their region, but they also have the right 
to buy from any retail supply company operating in the region.
The EML requires the regulated third party access (rTPA) regime for access 
to the transmission and distribution system. The regulatory body (the EMRA) 
will carry out the function of dispute settlement between parties.
As for public service obligations, the EML only allows for an explicit cash 
subsidy in the form of direct cash refunds to consumers without affecting the 
price structure in cases where some consumers need to be supported based 
on non-economic objectives.
The current market design does not envisage a centralized pool or power 
exchange. The actual real-time equality of demand and supply, given the 
bilateral contracts, will be carried out by the system operator (that is, TEIAS) 
through purchases and sales in a balancing market. For this purpose, a 
“System Balancing and Settlement Center” was established within TEIAS. In 
short, it is expected that the market would be mostly by bilateral contracts
and pool would be limited to balancing transactions only.
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3.2.2. Restructuring (or Unbundling)
As discussed above, TEAS has been further unbundled into EUAS 
(generation), TETAS (wholesale trading and contracting) and TEIAS 
(transmission), each organized as a separate legal entity.
Under the new structure, EUAS will take over existing public power plants 
that are not transferred to the private sector. TETAS is created to carry out 
wholesale operations and it seems that it will dominate wholesale market in 
the near future. TETAS is also the holder of all previous BOO, BOT and 
TOOR contracts, including long-term power purchase agreements with 
Treasury guaranties; and will assume other stranded costs. TEIAS is 
responsible for transmission and, critically, for the balancing and settlement 
procedure that will balance the power transactions among parties, both 
physically and financially, in the new framework. That is, TEIAS is the 
transmission system operator (TSO) in Turkey.
Turkey’s electricity distribution network was divided into 21 distribution 
regions. TEDAS, which owns 20 of the 21 regions, have been included in the 
privatization programme, and a separate distribution company has been 
established in each of these 20 regions. These distribution companies are 
currently owned by TEDAS.
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3.2.3. Privatization
The principal aims of EML have been to open the Turkish electricity market to 
competition and found an independent regulatory agency to regulate the 
industry. The law does not particularly stress privatization, even though it 
outlines general principles of privatizations (Article 1411). EML’s aim was to 
provide a way to a sustainable privatization by establishing a competitive 
environment.
In March 2004, the government issued the Strategy Paper Concerning 
Electricity Market Reform and Privatization, which outlines the major steps to 
be taken during the period up to 2012 and addresses various issues, 
including the privatization of distribution assets and power plants. 
According to the strategy paper, privatization will start in the distribution 
sector in 2005 and will be completed in 2006! After the privatization of 
distribution assets, generation privatization will start in mid-2006. Seventeen 
hydropower plants (which total 7,055 MW of capacity12), the transmission 
system and market operator, TEIAS, will remain in state ownership (IEA, 
2005, p 144).
3.3. Legal environment regarding privatization of distribution regions13
In Turkish administrative law, the Constitutional Court and the Danistay 
(Council of State) recognize all segments of the electricity industry as public 
services, requiring close supervision by public authorities. Turkish public law 
deems contracts for the provision of public services by private parties to be 
14
administrative contracts. Accordingly, such contracts are subject to public 
law.
Turkish Parliament passed a constitutional revision on August 13, 1999 to 
open the door to privatization in the electricity industry. To begin with, the 
amendment gave Parliament the authority to allow for the provision of public 
services through private law contracts. The amendment also allowed 
international arbitration in concession contracts, which was denied previously 
by the Constitutional Court and the Danistay.
Turkish Constitutional Court describes privatization as the transfer of public 
rights, monetary and non-monetary assets to domestic and foreign private 
entrepreneurs. In recent decisions, the court argued that ‘unlimited’ foreign 
ownership in strategic industries such as telecommunications and electricity 
would weaken national security and run contrary to the notion of sovereignty. 
Restrictions on foreign ownership were thus seen as a constitutional 
requirement. The decision provides a major rule for privatization. Since 
unlimited foreign ownership of energy and telecommunications industries 
undermines national sovereignty, any acceptable privatization should include 
reasonable checks and limits against foreign ownership14.
Turkish Constitutional Court makes a distinction between privatizations in 
generation and that of electricity distribution. The Court accepts that 
operating rights for generation facilities can be transferred to private 
enterprises for a limited time. However, natural resources cannot be privately 
owned. Constitutional Court does not deny the ability to transfer ownership 
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rights (TOR) of a public company to private entrepreneurs in the case of 
electricity generation. In the text of the decision, the Court does not separate 
the ownership of the natural resource and any plant that uses the resource. 
In the case of distribution facilities, the Court permits TOR model. However, it 
does not mention the transfer of ownership rights of a distribution facility to 
private entrepreneurs. The Danistay has the same opinion on this issue. It 
seems that there is no constitutional restriction here. 
The Constitutional Court and the Danistay take the public interest as the 
decisive criterion in their investigations on privatization cases; however, they 
cite the vague concept of public interest without giving a clear definition of 
what is in the public’s interest. The reluctance to define public interest 
explicitly and precisely leaves plenty of room for political and legal 
maneuvering. Actually, this is one of the reasons why we do not find any 
clear description of public interest. The controversial nature of the notion of 
‘public interest’ and varying interpretations of the concept by the political 
authority and judiciary has led to the annulment by the Constitutional Court 
and the Danistay of many privatization attempts in recent years. The 
resultant uncertainty about the outcome of privatizations, naturally, has 
increased the cost of privatization and served to discourage potential 
investors.
To come to the point, today, there are two regulations on electricity 
distribution privatizations. The older of the two provides the framework for the 
transfer of operation rights, enacted in 1984 (Law 3096, known as the ‘‘BOT 
Law’’). The Cabinet has the authority to decide on privatization and MENR 
16
oversees the process. No transfer of ownership can be made through this 
process. The newer regulation is Article 14 of EML. However, this article 
does not provide the rules and methods of privatizations and refers to the 
general law on privatizations (Law 4046), mentioning only that MENR should 
provide proposals and/or opinions for a prospective electricity services 
privatization and also that foreigners cannot have controlling market power. 
Law 4046 provides the rules and regulations for any privatization in Turkey. 
The Privatization Administration (PA), established under this law as an 
administrative agency, implements and regulates privatizations. It undertakes 
the management of companies in the process of privatization. The law also 
describes methods of privatization, gives authority to the PA to determine the 
value of the company, and the authority to oversee the process of 
privatization.
3.4. TEDAS privatization overview15
Turkish Privatization Administration (PA) has started the privatization of 
Turkey’s electricity distribution utility, TEDAS. PA has decided to start the 
privatization process with the simultaneous tender of three companies, each 
operating in respective regions, namely Ankara (BEDAS), Anatolian part of 
Istanbul (AYEDAS) and Sakarya (SEDAS).
3.4.1. The model
Privatization of distribution companies will be executed using a Transfer of 
Operating Rights (TOR) backed Share Sale model (TSS model). According 
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to this model, the investor will be the sole owner of the shares of the 
distribution company which will be the unique licensee for the distribution of 
electricity in the designated region but which will not have the ownership of 
distribution network assets and other items that are essential for the 
operation of distribution assets. The ownership of these distribution assets 
will remain with TEDAS. The investor, through its shares in the distribution 
company, however, will be granted the right to operate the distribution assets 
pursuant to a Transfer of Operating Rights Agreement (TOR Agreement) with 
TEDAS.
Under the envisaged market structure, privatized electricity distribution 
companies will operate as regional monopolies with distribution licenses 
granted by EMRA. As part of ongoing liberalization efforts in the energy 
sector, Turkey’s distribution network was divided into 21 distribution regions 
based on geographical proximity, managerial structure, energy demand and 
other technical/financial factors. After the inclusion of TEDAS in the 
privatization programme, a separate distribution company was established by 
the PA in each one of the 20 distribution regions owned by TEDAS. The only 
distribution region operated by a partially private company is Kayseri.
The aim of the TSS model is to handover a fully operating distribution 
company to the investor. Establishment of the distribution company as a 
separate legal entity, signing of the TOR Agreement, provision of distribution 
and retail sales licenses and signing of the Energy Sales Agreements have 
been defined as the necessary pre-requisites for the TSS model 
18
implementation. All of these steps have already been completed prior to the 
privatization tender announcement.
In the TSS model, the ownership of the existing assets and the new assets 
arising from investments to be carried out by the investor rests with TEDAS. 
The investor shall purchase the shares of a company which holds the 
operating rights of distribution assets and all related assets (e.g., buildings, 
vehicles, machine park), and the electricity distribution and retail licenses in a 
given region. All investments shall be realized by the investor and will be 
recovered through the tariffs. Except for cases of investor misconduct, the 
part of investments not yet recovered via the tariffs shall be paid by TEDAS 
to the investor upon the expiry or termination of the contract.
3.4.2. Tariffs
The main purpose of the market liberalization is to achieve lower tariffs by 
increasing overall system efficiency. Accordingly, the tariffs are calculated as 
“cost-reflective” based on predetermined operating and loss/theft 
improvement targets.
The first tariff implementation period (or transition period), set as five years 
from 2006 to 2010, will serve as the transitory period to a fully cost based 
tariff structure after 2010. EMRA has already approved the end user tariffs 
and revenue requirements of each distribution company for the transition 
period. Revenue requirements cover the projected expenses for providing 
distribution and retail services and provide an allowance for the target level of 
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technical and non-technical losses. The end-user tariffs for the period after 
2010 will be determined by the distribution companies in accordance with the 
Electricity Market Tariffs Communiqué and the related regulations and will be 
subject to EMRA’s approval.
The first implementation period is designed to have a smooth and gradual 
transition from existing tariff structure to a lean and simple tariff structure. As 
of 2010, most customer groups will have cost based tariffs in place and the 
tariff groups will be simplified to five only, namely residential, industrial, 
commercial, agricultural irrigation and lightening.
According to the Electricity Market Law, the Electricity Market Tariffs 
Communiqué and other related regulation, the four tariff components; (a) 
retail sales, (b) distribution, (c) retail services and (d) transmission; are 
governed in an unbundled fashion. Retail sales tariff has a “price cap” which 
is set as the basket price of the energy purchased by the distribution 
company. Distribution and retail services have “revenue caps” which cover 
operating expenses and investment requirements related to distribution and 
retail services. Transmission tariff is a complete pass-through of transmission 
costs as charged by the national transmission company.
The existing “national tariff” scheme will be maintained for the first tariff 
implementation period, rather than implementing “regional tariffs” so that 
sudden price fluctuations could be avoided (currently, regional cost based 
tariffs vary significantly due to wide variation of loss/theft levels and other 
parameters across the regions). Implementation of national tariffs, however, 
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will result in revenue imbalances since the distribution company revenues will 
differ from their envisaged revenue caps. In order to remove such 
imbalances, EMRA will put in place a tariff equalization scheme to transfer 
revenues across the regions.
While the overall tariffs are pre-determined and approved for 2006-2010, the 
tariff revision process has still not been finalized. The exact nature and 
details of the process are expected to be announced by the EMRA soon.
3.4.3. Investments
One of the primary objectives of privatization is to finance required 
distribution system and network improvements and expansions through 
private sector investments, thereby removing the burden of such investments 
away from the state budget. Investments are of great importance in ensuring 
continuity and quality of service in electricity distribution.
The annual expansion, replacement and improvement investments that are 
required in each of the 20 distribution regions during the first tariff 
implementation period (2006–2010) have been determined during the 
preparation of the end-user tariffs. For TEDAS as a whole, the investment 
requirement for the transition period is a total of YTL 2.8 billion ($2.3 billion), 
distributed equally to each year of the transition period. These investments 
have been embedded into the first implementation period tariffs approved by 
EMRA; hence, they will be recouped by the distribution companies over time. 
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Investment requirements could be updated by EMRA through the revision 
mechanisms.
After 2010, distribution companies will prepare annual investment plans each 
year by making projections on consumption growth, analyzing network
expansion requirements and other technical parameters. They will then 
present these investment plans to EMRA for approval. After receiving EMRA 
approval, distribution companies are obliged to implement the approved 
plans. Implementation of these investments (i.e. investment amount and 
form) will be monitored through investment control and quality measurement 
mechanisms set up by EMRA in collaboration with the distribution 
companies.
EMRA approved tariffs do incorporate an allowed level of regulated return on 
the investments and services to be carried out as part of the electricity sales 
& distribution activities. In addition to this allowed level of return, the 
distribution company can create substantial value by beating the pre-
approved loss/theft and operational efficiency targets.
3.4.4. The progress so far
On January 9, 2007, the Turkish government announced the postponement 
of the privatization of parts of the country's electricity distribution network 
amid fears that it would lead to higher prices for consumers in a general 
election year. During a trip abroad, the prime minister unsettled some of his 
cabinet colleagues and the financial markets by suggesting that the sell-off 
22
might be too politically sensitive as Turkey nears polls, scheduled for 
November 2007.
On July 1, 2008, the Turkish Privatization Administration put out two 
distribution regions to tender. Turkey's Sabanci Holding (Enerjisa) and 
Austrian power giant Verbund submitted the highest bid in the first tender for 
Baskent Electricity Distribution Corporation (BEDAS) with an offer of $1.225 
billion. In the second separate tender, Akcez consortium offered highest bid 
for Sakarya Electricity Distribution Corporation (SEDAS) with $600 million. 
The consortium of Verbund and Sabanci would pay $1.225 billion for 100 
percent stakes of Baskent, which supplies 10 terawatt hours of electricity to 
2.9 million customers in and around the Turkish capital of Ankara. In the 
second tender, Akcez consortium offered the highest bid for the bargaining 
for the block sale of Sakarya Electricity Distribution Corporation with $600 
million. The Ankara and Sakarya grids together have 4.2 million customers 
who consume a combined 18 million gigawatt-hours of electricity.
Turkey's first auction of power grids attracted just two foreign utilities firms, 
compared with at least eight that planned to participate in 2006, as the 
increased political uncertainty in Turkey added to the deteriorating global 
financial conditions.
Recently, the government also raised the price of electricity for residential 
use by 22 percent, and the price of electricity for industrial use by 21 recently. 
The price hikes, part of an overhaul of Turkey's electricity pricing mechanism, 
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is seen as an important step for the privatizations of electricity distribution 
and production assets.
Next up for sale are power grids covering the central Anatolian region of 
Meram, and Aras in the east.
4. Why should the distribution be privatized?
The growing empirical evidence on the inefficiency of state-owned 
enterprises and a worldwide trend toward liberalization are the main 
motivations of privatization in many developing countries. Turkish public 
enterprises in general and Turkish public electricity distribution companies in 
particular have not been the exceptions.
The balance between state and market experienced a radical shift with the 
fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. Since then, the boundaries of the state have 
started to shift; and the privatizations in Britain and the transition from state 
socialism to the market economy in Eastern Europe accelerated this shift. 
Within less then a decade, privatization spread around the world. Today, the 
English model of vertical separation succeeded by privatization and 
regulation is rapidly becoming the reference model for reform in both 
developed and developing countries. 
Electricity is a product that is generally regarded as nonstorable16. Also, the 
demand for electricity fluctuates by time of day and year, as the weather 
varies, and randomly. Supply is also subject to unpredictable outages. 
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However, the equilibrium between supply and demand, called “electrical 
equilibrium”, must be maintained continuously and throughout the system, 
which calls for extremely close minute-by-minute coordination between 
generation and transmission & distribution. 
In view of technical characteristics of the industry, a policy of vertically 
integrated monopoly has some attractions. The integrated 
generation/transmission/distribution company can easily run its power 
stations that meet demand at minimum cost at each point in time. Moreover, 
in the longer run, investment can be planned to give the optimal mix and 
capacity to meet prospective demand with reasonable security of supply. 
This is, actually, the main reason why these activities have historically been 
vertically integrated. Nevertheless, since they allow no room for competition 
and its associated incentives, such schemes nowadays have started to be 
replaced by vertically separated private utilities with the aim of fostering 
competition.
In economic theory, the reasons for privatization are manifold. The ultimate 
and most important aim of privatization is ensuring “economic efficiency”; and 
it can be realized in full sense only by effective competition, which requires 
reducing the role of government in economic life as a whole. The case for 
private ownership rests essentially on the importance of incentives to 
innovate and to reduce costs. The weak incentive of government employees 
concerning both cost reduction and innovation is the basic reason of 
superiority of private ownership. In a state-owned company, prices do not 
reflect costs; and costs themselves are usually inflated through excessive 
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employment and excessively expensive capital; incentives to innovate are 
reduced to minimum (or in worst cases to zero); quality of service is lower 
than in a competitive environment; and the number of choices available to 
consumers is extremely limited (or even reduced to one!). What is more 
striking and dangerous is that until the point when it is seen to be in crisis 
from outside, a public enterprise never feels a failure no matter what is the 
degree of its failure in realizing economic efficiency.
The other reasons for privatization cited in the literature may be summarized 
as follows. Privatization provides competition with a fertile ground to develop. 
Also, it is argued that the valuation of the company by movements in its 
share price in stock exchanges is potentially an important check on a 
privatized enterprise’s performance. Moreover, the possibility of a hostile 
takeover in a competitive market imposes a fierce discipline on the 
management and provides a powerful incentive to good management 
because a takeover usually leads to many changes near the top. 
Furthermore, some scholars claim that the most important effect of 
privatization is that the changes it brings about become practically 
irreversible. In the case of reforming public enterprises, the possibility is 
much greater that a change of government or even just a change in the 
opinion of the same government will undermine all reforms and may result in 
a return to the old interventionism and confusion. Privatization, on the other 
hand is less reversible not only because the legislation needed to reverse it 
would be more complex, and because in some cases the privatized bodies 
have disappeared into other firms or acquired overseas ownership, but also 
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because too many interests have been created that are opposed to 
renationalization (Erdogdu, 2005).
In Turkish case, the officially declared reasons for the privatization of 
electricity distribution regions are as follows (OIB, 2008): 
o Efficiency improvement and cost reduction 
o Ensuring security of electricity supply and improvement in quality of 
electricity supplied
o Reduction in distribution loss/theft levels
o Getting private sector made necessary investments in electricity 
distribution business
o Exploiting the benefits of competition and directing those benefits to 
consumers
5. Guidelines for Policy Makers
Having discussed both the background and current status of developments in 
Turkish electricity distribution segment let me comment on them. On the 
positive side and from the investors’ point of view, the benefits and 
opportunities of the envisaged system can been summarized as follows. First 
of all, the investor is allowed to retain excess value derived from 
outperforming the predetermined loss/theft targets approved by EMRA. 
Accordingly, as a result of this policy, technical and non-technical losses, 
which have become an excessive financial burden in Turkey over the years, 
are expected to be reduced to single digit figures. Also, the investor is 
27
allowed to retain the savings achieved if energy is sourced at a lower 
wholesale cost than the regulated reference price. This policy will pave the 
way for construction of low-cost electricity production facilities going forward. 
Furthermore, the investor is allowed to retain excess value derived from 
outperforming the predetermined operational improvement targets approved 
by EMRA. This will trigger efficiency improvements in electricity distribution. 
At each distribution company, substantial operational efficiency 
improvements are believed to be achievable through optimizing core 
business processes such as billing and collections, arranging and
redesigning work flows, enabling effective coordination between divisions, 
improving information systems and infrastructure and optimizing personnel 
productivity (Lazard, 2007).
Within this context, the efficiency improvements in distribution segment is 
especially crucial since distribution cost together with generation cost make 
up more than 75% of electricity bill of a household in Turkey, which means 
that any efficiency increase in distribution industry may be redirected to 
reductions in electricity bills. Table 4 provides the distribution of costs in 
electricity bill of a household in Turkey.
[ Table 4 goes here ]
On the negative side, there exist some crucial problems that must be 
addressed to establish a healthy system of electricity distribution. First of all, 
as indicated, the main components of electricity price can be divided into the 
wholesale price, the price of network operations (transmission & distribution) 
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and taxes. Since wholesale price, tax related issues and the price of 
transmission network operations are outside the scope of the present paper, 
let me concentrate on the price of distribution network operations. We know 
that even tax level, wholesale price and the price of transmission network 
operations are determined efficiently, total welfare can be significantly 
disturbed if distribution network operations are priced inefficiently. In 
literature, it is argued that if a sector presents natural monopoly 
characteristics (i.e., real competition is not possible), the only two reasonable 
ways to determine the price of distribution network operations are
benchmarking and frequent tenders. However, in Turkey, the current model 
seems to be based on a kind of rate of return regulation, in which costs are 
determined by the regulated firm and the regulator approves them before 
their reflection into tariffs. Since, the regulator cannot determine the optimal 
level of costs due to the problem of asymmetric information; such a system is 
far from ensuring economic efficiency. Therefore, a kind of benchmarking or 
frequent tenders should be incorporated in tariff determination process in 
Turkey17.
Second, the current situation of continued state-ownership of the distribution 
companies limits the supervisory role of EMRA over the market. The lack of 
necessary incentive mechanisms for managers and bureaucrats in the 
distribution companies makes regulatory enforcement more difficult and 
leaves room for political pressure in the industry. Therefore, the privatization 
of distribution companies must be completed as soon as possible in an 
appropriate way. The opposition to privatization of some bureaucrats will 
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definitely be formidable. To counter this, a chairman who is more favorable to 
privatization may be appointed to the enterprises to be privatized18.
Third, it seems that current model of privatization (TOR) is preferred in 
electricity distribution to prevent a situation of double payment by end-users. 
Since infrastructure costs have already been recouped by the state—more 
precisely, by taxpayers—prior to privatization, if the distribution assets are 
sold, then the purchasing company would reflect such asset costs to the 
tariffs and customers will be made to pay twice for the same cost. Although it 
is a reasonable approach, the use of the TOR model as the method of 
privatization creates its own problems. For instance, it seems that in the 
tenders for distribution regions the competing firms will bid based on the 
shares of the distribution company which will be the unique licensee for the 
distribution of electricity in the designated region. However, such a method is 
far from realizing irreversibility of the privatization process as it is very easy to 
return back to previous structure since ownership of the assets are not 
transferred to private parties. Actually, from an economic point of view, a 
method based on the transfer of asset ownership to private parties and a 
tender based on “unit service and depreciation charge” are much more 
preferable to current practices.
The fourth concern is related with ambiguity of the process following tenders. 
That is, how long will a firm be a unique licensee for the distribution of 
electricity in the designated region? If an incumbent distribution company 
prefers to put an end to its activities, what will happen? Will there be another 
tender? If yes, will new firm pay to previous firm for the shares? In the 
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literature, it is stated that repeating tenders on a specific basis is urgent if 
benchmarking is not employed in the tariff determination process because it 
remains the only way to reflect the cost reductions to consumers. If both 
benchmarking and frequent tenders are not employed, then the incumbent 
firm gets all benefits of cost reduction without reflecting them to tariffs. In 
Turkey, both of these methods are not planned to be employed so there 
exists a threat of excessive profits in the sector.
Other three concerns relate to “expertise”, “effective regulation” and 
“institutionalization”. To begin with, all persons or bodies that do not have 
sufficient expertise in issues related with energy markets but whose ideas or 
decisions have still a vital effect on the energy market should consult those 
with expertise before revealing their ideas or making some decisions with an 
(sometimes, profound) effect on the energy market. The decisions of courts 
are especially critical in this respect. Also, effective regulation by EMRA is 
extremely imperative to set up a fully functioning market. Therefore, EMRA 
needs to be prepared for such a regulatory function by equipping itself with 
necessary tools, such as highly qualified staff, necessary technological 
infrastructure and so on. The last issue is the institutionalization of the whole 
process of market reform, including privatization, tariff setting etc. As we 
know that the expressed intent toward privatization and liberalization do not 
always mesh with political preferences. While politicians have long-term 
desires to privatize state owned enterprises (like, TEDAS), their short-term 
goals and bureaucratic stronghold cause them to remain tied to the reigns of 
economic power and potential rent sources. Without institutionalization, 
Turkish electricity distribution sector will not be able to get rid of the dump of 
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unimplemented plans and timetables, such as the Strategy Paper of March 
2004; will continue to be directed by sudden and unexpected unilateral acts 
of politicians, as in the case of previous postponement of tenders by prime 
minister in January 2007; and rent seeking activities in overextended public 
institutions will continue to harm by encouraging economic inefficiencies, thus 
causing welfare losses and wealth transfers due to higher electricity prices.
Finally, at first sight, auction model appears to provide a very attractive way 
of combining competition and efficiency without any heavy burden for the 
regulator. The competition for market appears to destroy the undesirable 
monopoly of information that hinders conventional regulation, and price is set 
by competition, not by bureaucrats. Provided bidding is competitive, an
auction will reduce the profits to the normal competitive level by inducing bid 
prices equal to unit costs of production. 
Nevertheless, auction model is not without some difficulties. First of all, as 
mentioned above, bidding must be competitive and cases of collusive bidding 
need to be prevented. There exist mainly two reasons why bidding might fail 
to be competitive. First of all, there is a danger of collusion between bidders, 
especially if they are few in number19, or if the firms are effectively in a 
repeated interaction (or, “game”) with one another via frequent contracts. The 
second reason is that one firm might enjoy such strategic advantages in the 
competition for the franchise that other firms would be unwilling to compete 
with it. For instance, suppose that an incumbent firm is the holder of a 
franchise that is now up for renewal. Since, thanks to its past operation of the 
franchise, the incumbent has already reduced its costs; other firms will be 
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unwilling to compete with the incumbent as they know that they are unlikely 
to win the competition. Also, another source of incumbent advantage may 
originate from asymmetries of information. The incumbent’s knowledge of 
cost and demand conditions is likely superior to that of any other firm, which 
tends to deter others from competing with it in the future auction. 
The merits of auction model are further reduced by the issues related with 
asset handover. Unless sunk costs are zero (an extremely unlikely event), 
efficiency requires that the new operator of the franchise takes over the 
assets from the incumbent20. Therefore, one needs to decide how the assets 
to be valued for this purpose. In such a case, there is a problem of bilateral 
monopoly. If incumbent has no alternative, it has to accept as little as the 
scrap value of the assets. If the new operator firm has no alternative, it has to 
pay as much as their replacement value. The gap between replacement 
value and scrap value is likely to be large if the assets involve sunk costs. 
The last difficulty with auction model is the question of specification, 
administration and monitoring of franchise contract. The duration of franchise 
contract must also be considered. The difficulties of contract specification 
and administration perhaps suggest that short-term contracts have 
advantages, because fewer future unforeseeable events then need to be 
considered. Nevertheless, the organization of frequent contests for the 
franchise also involves major costs: all the problems of asset valuation and 
handover occur more often, and the industry would frequently be in a state of 
turmoil.
33
6. Conclusion
Although Turkish electricity reform is not concluded yet, we can assess its 
performance to date in achieving its primary goals. The reform is quite 
complex and addresses different objectives. The main one is to change the 
government to policy-maker and regulator, transferring the responsibility of 
operations and investment to the private sector. This change was imposed by 
its unwillingness and incapacity to finance system expansion and by the 
urgent necessity of attracting private investment, which is crucial to avoid an 
electricity supply collapse. That is, the privatization of the Turkish electricity 
distribution sector is not a social option; it is mandated by economic 
constraints, since the government does not have the capacity to invest and 
guarantee electricity supply to support economic growth.
In this paper, we have tried to present current situation of Turkish electricity 
distribution privatizations and summarize some problems that surround them. 
The paper is for the most part limited to the economic dimension of the 
problems and their practical implications. The privatization experience in the 
Turkish electricity distribution segment is of considerable interest for 
observing how globalization via international investment in the privatization of 
an emerging country’s strategic sector deals with local patriotic reactions 
arising from various national entities, including the national judiciary and 
bureaucratic establishment (Ulusoy et al., 2007).
Despite relatively good legislative framework, the current Turkish policy on 
privatization of distribution regions in practice seems to be far from ideal. The 
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whole privatization process appears to aim providing additional revenues to 
treasury without paying attention to the crucial underlying economic logic. It 
should not be forgotten that every new structure entails new understanding of 
the issues. If privatization process progresses based on underlying economic 
logic, there is no reason not to believe that the domestic and foreign 
investors will be greatly interested in entering a market with excellent growth 
potential, like Turkish electricity distribution business. Also, one should not 
blame the bureaucrats in the Turkish energy industry, its unions, and others 
for trying to protect what they see as their interests by persuading the 
government to retain previous structure as much as possible. But it will have 
a devastating effect for the country if they are successful in doing so as the
way would be open for continued manipulation of state owned electricity 
distribution companies.
In a few words, Turkey is at a crossroads and she needs to answer the 
question of whether the operation and management of electricity distribution 
networks in this country will evolve into a market-driven commodity business 
or remain a genuine public utility task. As only a limited number of actions
has been taken in the privatization process so far, a significant amount of 
work still lies ahead to answer that question.
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Footnotes
                                                
1 In October 2005, accession negotiations are opened with Turkey, who has been an 
associate member of the EU since 1963 and an official candidate since 1999. For a more 
detailed discussion of EU-Turkey relations, see Erdogdu (2002).
2 For a more in depth discussion of nuclear energy in Turkey, see Erdogdu (2007c).
3 The industrials customer group represents approximately 50% of the total demand, while 
residential customers consume slightly less than a quarter of the total. Commercials 
customer group, excluding public institutions, is placed third in terms of consumption with a 
13% share.
4 Turkey imports 96.9% of her natural gas consumption.
5 The author himself is working for the EMRA.
6 Unless otherwise stated, this part is mainly based on the information included in Erdogdu 
(2005).
7 In 1982, however, distribution was also transferred to TEK, thus making TEK a national 
vertically integrated monopoly fully owned by the state.
8 Under the BOO model, investors retain ownership of the facility at the end of the contract 
period. That is, it is a kind of licensing system rather than a concession award.
9 A typical BOT, BOO or TOOR generation contract, signed between the private party and 
TEAS or TEDAS, includes exclusive “take or pay” obligations with fixed quantities (in 
general, 85% of the plant output) and prices (or price formulas) over 15-30 years. That is, 
under these models, the government retains most commercial risks while providing the 
private sector with substantial rewards. Also the situation was worse in Turkey as, in Turkish 
case; there was no requirement for prequalification or even for a competitive open tender to 
conclude these contracts (Atiyas and Dutz, 2003), which resulted in onerous terms and high 
electricity prices.
10 EML is, for the most part, compatible with the EU Electricity Directive of 2003.
11 Article 14 of this law is as follows: 'The Ministry shall provide the Privatization 
Administration with proposals and opinions regarding the privatization of the assets 
belonging to TEDAS and EUAS, their subsidiaries, affiliates, partnerships and operational 
units and facilities. The privatization process shall be executed by the Privatization 
Administration according to the provisions of Privatization Law no: 4046. The foreign real 
42
                                                                                                                                         
persons and legal entities engaged in the market activities as defined by this Law within the 
scope of privatization activities cannot have a market share that will enable them with a 
control power in the electricity generation, transmission and distribution sectors.'
12 This figure equals to 19.5 % of total installed capacity in Turkey.
13 Unless otherwise stated, this part is mainly based on the information included in Ulusoy et 
al. (2007).
14 This concern of Turkish Constitutional Court is ‘partly’ alleviated by Article 14 of the EML. 
According to this article, foreign real persons and legal entities cannot have a market share 
that will give them controlling power in the electricity generation, transmission and 
distribution sectors.
15 Unless otherwise stated, this part is mainly based on the information included in Lazard 
(2007).
16 Armstrong et al. (1994, p 280) reports that there is a sense in which some hydroelectric 
power can be stored. In the UK, the National Grid Company has a pumped storage business 
in the Welsh mountains. Water pumped uphill at night can produce hydroelectric power the 
following day, thereby effectively storing some night-time electricity. This is economically 
efficient, provided that the day/night electricity price ratio is high enough.
17 For a more in depth discussion of the subject in general and “problem of asymmetric 
information” in particular, see Erdogdu (2007b).
18 Another important problem is the unions’ reaction to privatizations. There is much at stake 
and unions are expected to take all legal and political measures to stop privatizations until 
their demands are satisfied. In fact, they have challenged privatizations in court in almost all 
recent privatizations. In many cases, privatizations were cancelled based on legal 
technicalities. Unions also lobby the government in order to get better pecuniary gains for 
their displaced members.
19 Since, in electricity distribution industry, the requisite skills and/or resources are rare; it is 
generally the case.
20 Otherwise there will be inefficient duplication of assets.
Table 1. Selected indicators for Turkey (2004)
Indicator Value
Population (million) 71,158,647 (July 2007 est.)
Population growth rate 1.04% (2007 est.)
GDP (purchasing power parity) $640.4 billion (2006 est.)
GDP (official exchange rate) $361.1 billion (2006 est.)
GDP real growth rate 6.1% (2006 est.)
GDP per capita (PPP) $9,100 (2006 est.)
Electricity production 154.2 billion kWh (2005)
Electricity consumption 129 billion kWh (2005)
Electricity Consumption / 
Population (kWh/capita)
1766.00
CO2 Emissions
a (Mt of CO2) 209.45
a CO2 Emissions from fuel combustion only. Emissions are calculated 
using IEA's energy balances and the Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines.
Table 2. Energy balances for Turkey (2004)
Supply and Consumption Coal Crude Oil
Petroleum 
Products
Gas Nuclear Hydro
Geothermal, 
Solar, etc.
Combustibles 
Renewables 
and Waste
Electricity Heat Totala
Production 10531 2224 0 566 0 3963 1271 5557 0 0 24111
Imports 11200 23748 10481 18117 0 0 0 0 40 0 63587
Exports 0 0 -5289 0 0 0 0 0 -98 0 -5387
International Marine Bunkersb 0 0 -1005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1005
Stock Changes 648 -183 115 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 599
TPES 22379 25789 4302 18704 0 3963 1271 5557 -59 0 81905
Transfers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical Differences -64 191 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 126
Electricity Plants -8701 0 -764 -7964 0 -3963 -85 -21 12436 0 -9063
CHP Plants -75 0 -1131 -3028 0 0 0 -5 524 450 -3265
Heat Plants -532 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -532
Gas Works 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Petroleum Refineries 0 -26065 26534 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 469
Coal Transformation -1910 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1910
Liquefaction Plants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Transformation 0 85 -85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Own Use -302 0 -1706 -100 0 0 0 0 -615 0 -2724
Distribution Losses -27 0 0 -19 0 0 0 0 -1999 0 -2045
TFC 10766 0 27150 7594 0 0 1186 5530 10287 450 62962
Industry sector 8361 0 4460 2178 0 0 121 0 4992 0 20112
Transport sector 0 0 13079 105 0 0 0 0 63 0 13246
Other sectors 2405 0 5858 4881 0 0 1065 5530 5233 450 25420
Residential 2405 0 2879 3640 0 0 1065 5530 2375 0 17894
Commercial and Public Services 0 0 0 1240 0 0 0 0 2522 0 3763
Agriculture / Forestry 0 0 2979 0 0 0 0 0 318 0 3297
Fishing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 17
Non-Specified 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 450 450
Non-Energy Use 0 0 3754 430 0 0 0 0 0 0 4184
- of which 0 0 1406 430 0 0 0 0 0 0 1836
Petrochemical Feedstocks
(in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe) on a net calorific value basis)
a Totals may not add up due to rounding.
b International marine bunkers are not subtracted out of the total primary energy supply for world totals.
Table 3. Installed capacity and electricity generation in Turkey (2005)
Fuel Type
Installed 
Capacity (MW)
%
Electricity 
Generation (GWh)
%
Natural Gas 14,199 36.58 72,700 44.74
Hydropower 12,906 33.25 40,800 25.11
Coal 9,117 23.49 40,700 25.05
Oil 2,527 6.51 8,000 4.92
Biomass 28 0.07 150 0.09
Geothermal 23 0.06 90 0.06
Wind 20 0.05 60 0.04
Total 38,820 100 162,500 100
Table 4. The distribution of costs in electricity bill of a household in Turkey (2008)
YTL/kWh %
Generation (a) 0,121069 64,07
Transmission (b) 0,004152 2,20
Distribution (c) 0,021417 11,33
Retail Sale (d) 0,001639 0,87
Total (A=a+b+c+d) 0,148277 78,47
Energy Fund (%1) (e) 0,001483 0,78
TRT Share (%2) (f) 0,002966 1,57
Municipality Consumption Tax (%5) (g) 0,007414 3,92
Total (B=e+f+g) 0,011862 6,28
VAT (%18) (C=[A+B]*0,18) 0,028825 15,25
TOTAL (A+B+C) 0,188964 100,00
